28 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT

: Appearance of Mr. Dulles before the PCIIA Scheduled for Wednesday, 29 April 1953.

REFERENCES

- Letter of 3 April 1953 to Mr. Dulles from Robert Blum.
- b. Memorandum of 16 April 1953 to C/Ops/PP.
- 1. Recognizing that the questions raised in Blum's letter mentioned above cannot be answered accurately without considerable detail, the following discussion of his questions has still been kept brief since it is only intended to provide some clues that might prove helpful to Mr. Dulles. Please let me know if any supplementary material is desired.
- 2. Policy with respect to covert operations: What should be their scope and purpose and their relation to foreign policy as a whole? In what situations should we rely on covert operations and in what situations should they be avoided?
 - a. Covert operations within the NSC 10/2 range only make a real contribution to the U.S. effort when they are in support of either specific foreign policy or military objectives or both. Operations not so conceived or merely directed at minor objectives are at best of temporary influence and are quite apt to amount to little more than harassment.
 - b. Covert operations should not be used where any other type of operation could effectively achieve the result. In other words, covert operations in a sense are a necessary evil and consequently should be avoided except where necessary.
 - c. The most fundamental and perhaps most obvious test is assuming an operation in the foreign field is necessary or highly desirable and assuming further that it cannot be performed by private or other effort so that if it is to be done at all, it is inevitably a government job, then it should be accomplished covertly if, and only if, known official U.S. participation would seriously diminish or destroy the effectiveness of the operation.
 - d. The reasons for the above have been confirmed on many occasions by experience. Exposure of covert operations.

regardless of

regardless of the cause, results in severe penalties not only to the operators but to the U.S.; covert operations, because of the demands of security and cover, are unavoidably more complex and devious and consequently less efficient than overt operations; and due to the limited corps of skilled personnel available to CTA the luxury of many operations cannot be enjoyed but rather a system of highly selective priority must be pursued in choosing operations having the greatest potential and still the best chance for success.


f. Two possible issues for discussion under this question, if Mr. Dulles wishes to consider them, are first, to what extent IIA or a "new propaganda agency" will be capable of either continuing or taking over the medium-to-light-gray operations heretofore engaged in by State and MSA; and second, to what extent is it appropriate for CIA to attempt to carry out large
These are big problems and ones
with which Mr. Dulles is very familiar. If desired we could provide separate material on both, but will not do so here.
3. An appraisal of our present and prospective ability to con-

- duct successful covert activities.
 - a. The ability of CTA is related almost exclusively to the number of experienced and competent personnel available, though, of course, availability of cover and budget are also extremely important.

1

d. Further, the

25X1



- government officials and by one press, are increasing.
- f. The ability of CTA to conduct effective operations within the Soviet bloc are severely limited by the nature of the Soviet police state, the first truly totalitarian state.
- g. The future capability of CTA's covert operations into the bloc may expand through the development of new techniques aimed at Soviet weaknesses. Research in this field will be continued and possibly increased.
- 4. Organization and control of covert operations in Washington and in the field: Should CIA have the responsibility or should it be some other agency? What should the relationship be to the State Department and to the Embassies?
 - a. Covert operations should remain in CIA:
 - (1) Covert operations and covert intelligence both use the same clandestine techniques and technical support facilities.
 - (2) The combination of covert operations and covert intelligence within the same organization provides for

more efficient

Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004300070002-8

		more efficient use of the very limited pool of skilled personnel both U.S. staff officers and foreign agents.	
	(3)	Counter-espionage protection to covert operations is now provided by CIA. Covert operations conducted outside of CTA would probably require a large degree of duplication of such counter-espionage protection.	
	(5)	Wherever two agencies or departments have been given the authority to conduct covert operations, the result has been disastrous.	-
(
task is prerequ d. support look to	to disite As all of for State	ast for the time being in CIA, because the present evelop clandestine organizations which are the s of successful guerrilla operations. lready stated, covert operations should be in oreign policy so CIA will and must continue to e for policy guidance and for advice on the posability of particular operations. In the field	
d be rep	lace	nt to which U.Sidentified or white propagandad by non-attributable or grey: Who should be repropaganda?	
d be republie for a.	olaced grey It ap	d by non-attributable or grey: Who should be re-	

c. The extent

Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIALRDP80B01676R004300070002-8

- c. The extent to which CIA can increase its efforts or assume projects now controlled by other departments or agencies is extremely limited. Most of the relevant factors have already been mentioned; lack of qualified personnel; limited cover; difficulties of covert operations; questions as to the desirability of including any large operation or one with a substantial overhead in a clandestine organization; and the whole problem of priorities i.e., the best and most productive use of limited assets.
- 6. The nature of psychological warfare: Is it a technique in its own right or an illusion that risks distorting the proper conception of foreign policy as a whole? What significance does this issue have for the reconstitution of the Psychological Strategy Board?
 - a. In the propaganda sense psychological warfare is a separate technique but it should not be considered an independent category of government action. The military, political and economic are independent weapons in their own right but not so psychological warfare. The last, as propaganda, is a technique for persuading those affected or interested of the value of the other three in friendly hands or their destructive effects in enemy hands. Moreover, aside from the propaganda technique aspect, there is unquestionably a psychological bonus or "extra" to any official government action so that the departments and agencies carrying out military, political or economic actions are also, whether or not they want to be, acting simultaneously as psychological wærriors. In this aspect the psychological factor is an element of the main decision but no more.
 - b. The subsidiary question to the above is, assuming psychological warfare is a known quantity, what portion of it should be clandestine? On this reference is again made to earlier statements, covert operations should be necessary and not possible of achievement otherwise; they should be attempted when only government can accomplish them and still Government's known participation would seriously diminish or destroy their effectiveness; in the propaganda field the subject matter and its distribution is essentially an overt matter and usually only effective if achieved through non-official channels (speaking of the free world). Consequently, covert efforts in the free world should be directed at penetration or control of channels where such penetration or control must be achieved without U.S. effort being divulged. In the Soviet bloc the limitations are so great that except for radio, efforts must be clandestine. As to radio the issues as between overt and covert have already been mentioned.

c. The PSB

Approved For Release 2003/05/05: CIA-RDP80B01676R004300070002-8

c. The PSB should be eliminated for organizational reasons though many of its functions should continue preferably under the NSC. As indicated above, all government activity has a psychological kicker attached to it. Weight should be given to this by joint departmental discussion and decision. Moreover, the technique of propaganda should receive joint consideration. Thus PSB functions should continue, but a separate agency is not only unnecessary but less effective than using the existing mechanism of NSC. (This discussion could be elaborated but will only do so if requested.)

C. TRACY BARNES
Chief
Political and Psychological Warfare

cc: C/OPS/DDP

Security Information

Mr Talor

4/29/53

MEMORANDUM FOR HEARING BEFORE JACKSON COMMITTEE

- 1. General attitude of CIA toward covert activities and guerrilla warfare activities
- 2. Attitude respecting assumption of "grey activities" of
 State Department
 - a) Real distinction is not black grey white but
 whether US Govt. sponsorship should or should
 not appear
- 3. Essential that there should be only one USA agency responsible for covert operations abroad and difficulty divorcing these operations from CIA, if CIA is to continue covert collection of secret intelligence (espionage)
- 4. In general CIA being asked to carry on too extensive covert operations pending development of adequate personnel
- Possibility of bringing in private enterprise the super foundation idea

- 6. Bob Blum's questions:
 - a) Relation of covert operations to foreign policy
 - b) Ability to conduct successful covert operations
 - c) Responsibility for covert operations whether CIA or elsewhere
 - d) Handling of "grey field"
 - e) The nature of psychological warfare is it technique in its own right or does it distort conception of foreign policy as a whole reconstitution of Psychological Strategy Board (refer to need for coordination this week's example immigration proposal and MIG 15 defection proposal)

OUTLINE FOR BRIEFING OF JACKSON COMMITTEE.

- 1. Our estimate of Soviet intentions -- continuation of Cold War techniques at least until atomic gap closed. (Theory of "enoughness").
- 2. Despite slowing in tempo of Soviet successes no reason to estimate Soviet feel further successes impossible. Vis: Critical areas, Southeast Asia, Middle East, Central Africa, Latin America.
- 3. Soviet had long head start in Cold War (Warsaw and post Yalta techniques, long education in techniques of revolution and subversion).
- 4. Only began set up our own covert organization in 19h8 after Czech Coup February 25, 1948, and Italian election problem April 18, 19, 1948. (10/2 18th June 1948, 10/5 October 23, 1951). Why covert operations placed in CIA. Relation covert operations to covert intelligence.
- 5. This function not sought and has strained capabilities -- Magnitude paper.
- 6. Detailed project by project report will be given at later date. Accept view of vital importance this activity.
- 7. As preliminary will present what the enemy is doing and outline of our activities in the Cold War.

<u> For Release 2003/05/05</u>

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet

		-			NO.	
C/PP					DATE	
	T 500.	POOM DATE OFFICER'S				
то	ROOM NO.	REC'D	FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS	
MD/ P					EVES ONLY	
······································						
			:		For Mr Duller	
					or the duller	
					_	
					Illen -	
		,	1		-	
					Here in the	
		:				
<u> </u>			-		material which you requested in connection	
		<u> </u>			requested in connection	
		:				
					with your approaching	
					syspeanance before the	
			<u> </u>		// // /i	
					Jackrew Committee.	
				+	while he	
					In han hew fary	
					by the staff under	
					Tracy Surver superinis	
					Company of the	
				1	in consultation with me,	
	1		-		and wherear I concur	
				1	unth and support most	
		•			1 it - I would setten	
					Sparar (b) and (c) Igpon	
				1 1	ATETEROOTS OF THE THE	